The Effects of Global Budget System on Local Traditional Medical Markets

A major incentive of global budget lies in the cap it places on total medical expenditures. Consequently, health care provision and behavior may change. On one hand, global budget may result in waste reduction and quality improvement. On the other hand, it may cause severe side effects such as inducing demand and patient-dumping. Health insurers may pay higher costs only to get lower quality. In the long run, global bedgeting system may change the medical market structure and effectively change medical practive, quality of care, and accessibility of care. Under the single-payer and market-oriented health care systems in Taiwan, how will global budget change the health care provision and behavior of traditional medicine? Based on health market competition theories, this study aims to analyze the effects of global budget under different market structures in the short run and in the long run. We analyze NHRI National Health Insurance Research Database data, using outpatient claims, hospital and clinic basic information, personele data, and ANOVA and regression analyses. The study focuses on how global budget has changed local Chinese outpatient market competiton, and how it changed the distribution of Chinese medical doctors.

Project ID:PG9303-1103
External Project ID:CCMP93-RD-023