An enhanced password authentication scheme providing password updating without smart cards

  • Chin Chen Chang*
  • , Hao Chuan Tsai
  • , Yi Hui Chen
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

In 2003, Yang, Chang, and Hwang proposed an enhanced scheme of Peyravivan-Zunic's password authentication scheme by using the Diffie-Hellman scheme. Later, Yoon, Ryu, and Yoo demonstrated that Yang-Chang-Hwang's scheme is vulnerable to a stolen-verifier attack and a denial-of-service attack, and then proposed an improved scheme. In this paper, we show that Yoon-Ryu-Yoo's scheme is still vulnerable to a stolen-verifier attack and a server spoofing attack under some reasonable assumption. In addition, we propose an improved scheme to eliminate such security flaws.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2007 International Conference on Multimedia and Ubiquitous Engineering, MUE 2007
Pages1210-1215
Number of pages6
DOIs
StatePublished - 2007
Externally publishedYes
Event2007 International Conference on Multimedia and Ubiquitous Engineering, MUE 2007 - Seoul, Korea, Republic of
Duration: 26 04 200728 04 2007

Publication series

NameProceedings - 2007 International Conference on Multimedia and Ubiquitous Engineering, MUE 2007

Conference

Conference2007 International Conference on Multimedia and Ubiquitous Engineering, MUE 2007
Country/TerritoryKorea, Republic of
CitySeoul
Period26/04/0728/04/07

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