How do the combined effects of CEO decision horizon and compensation impact the relationship between earnings pressure and R&D retrenchment?

Cheng Yu Lee, Heng Yu Chang*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal Article peer-review

17 Scopus citations

Abstract

Although relevant literature has been accumulated, how earnings pressure from stock analysts affects a firm's innovation expenditures remains unclear. In order to make this relationship more clear, this study investigates the impact of earnings pressure on a firm's research and development (R&D) investment by considering the combined effects of CEOs' decision horizon and incentives. Our hypotheses were tested by firms from the S&P 1500 during the period from 2000 to 2012. The findings reveal that earnings pressure has a detrimental effect on a firm's R&D investment, and also that it goes worse when CEOs have a shorter decision horizon. However, when it comes to compensation incentives, we found that either CEOs equipped with higher stock ownership or fewer stock options can reduce the adverse effect of a shorter decision horizon on the relationship between earnings pressure and R&D retrenchment.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1057-1071
Number of pages15
JournalTechnology Analysis and Strategic Management
Volume26
Issue number9
DOIs
StatePublished - 10 2014

Keywords

  • CEO decision horizon
  • R&D retrenchment
  • earnings pressure
  • stock option
  • stock ownership

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