Making rational decisions in N-by-N negotiation games with a trusted third party

Shih Hung Wu, Von Wun Soo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

The optimal decision for an agent in a given game situation depends on the decisions of other agents at the same time. Rational agents will find a stable equilibrium before taking an action, according to the assumption of rationality. We suggest that the rational agents can use the negotiation mechanism to reach the equilibrium. In previous works, we proposed the communication actions of guarantee and compensation to convince or persuade other agents with a trusted third party mediating the games. In this paper, we extend the negotiation mechanism to deal with n-by-n games and justify its optimality with the underlying assumptions. During the negotiation process, each agent makes suggestions on how they can reach equilibrium while maximizing its own payoff. The mechanism can deal with all the game situations and find an acceptable equilibrium that gives optimal payoffs for the agents.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationApproaches to Intelligent Agents - 2nd Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi-Agents, PRIMA 1999, Proceedings
EditorsHideyuki Nakashima, Chengqi Zhang
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages47-61
Number of pages15
ISBN (Print)3540668233, 9783540668237
DOIs
StatePublished - 1999
Externally publishedYes
Event2nd Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi-Agents, PRIMA 1999 - Kyoto, Japan
Duration: 02 12 199903 12 1999

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume1733
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference2nd Pacific Rim International Workshop on Multi-Agents, PRIMA 1999
Country/TerritoryJapan
CityKyoto
Period02/12/9903/12/99

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1999.

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