Trade Export Policy for Final Products with Strategic Participation in Middle Product Market

　　本文設立一兩國出口至第三國模型。二出口國中，一國擁有一家垂直整合廠商，另一國則存在兩家具有上、下游生產關係的廠商，分別專業化生產中間財及最終財。本文假設垂直整合廠商除了可以在第三國銷售最終財外，亦可以選擇是否該在另一出口國之中間財市場買賣中間財。本文的主要發現如下。第一，在最終財的出口上，擁有專業上游及下游廠的出口國必定採取出口補貼政策；但擁有垂直整合廠商的出口國可能採取出口補貼或出口課稅政策。第二，在考慮垂直整合廠商在中間財的買賣策略下，兩出口國在各自尋求其福利極大化的出口政策下，兩出口國的福利水準有可能都高於自由貿易下之福利水準。
　　This paper considers a model similar to Brander and Spencer (1985), except that one country has a vertically integrated (VI, hereafter) firm that simultaneously produces intermediate and final goods, and the other country has a vertically related industry inclusive of an upstream firm producing intermediate goods and a downstream firm producing final goods. Assuming the VI firm can participate in the intermediate goods market located in the other country, there are two main results in this paper. First, the country with a vertically related industry must choose to subsidize its downstream firm to export, while the country with a VI firm may strategically adopt a policy of export subsidy or to tax its final goods exports. Second, the level of welfare of each exporting country under their export trade policies may be higher than they are under free trade.