Web service allocations based on combinatorial auctions and market-based mechanisms

  • Szu Yin Lin*
  • , Bo Yuan Chen
  • , Chun Chieh Liu
  • , Von Wun Soo
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

The main idea in this paper is using Combinatorial Web Service Market Based Mechanism (CWSMBM) to allow service demanders bid for more than one service at the same time. It takes quality of service into consideration in the design of market allocation mechanisms. We define the cost-benefit threshold for service providers to decide whether to accept or reject service tasks. We found that the cost-benefit threshold improves the global benefit value effectively but would sometimes cause a starvation problem. But the starvation can be a trade-off in sacrificing some service demanders to enhance the global benefit.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2008 12th International Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work in Design, CSCWD
Pages452-458
Number of pages7
DOIs
StatePublished - 2008
Externally publishedYes
Event2008 12th International Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work in Design, CSCWD - Xi'an, China
Duration: 16 04 200818 04 2008

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 2008 12th International Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work in Design, CSCWD
Volume1

Conference

Conference2008 12th International Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work in Design, CSCWD
Country/TerritoryChina
CityXi'an
Period16/04/0818/04/08

Keywords

  • Combinatorial auctions
  • Market-based mechanism
  • Quality of service
  • Web service allocations

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